讲座主题：Window Dressing in the Public Sector: Evidence from China’s Compulsory Education Promotion Program

主讲嘉宾：刘畅，中国人民大学国家发展与战略研究院助理教授

讲座时间：2022年11月9日10:00-12:00

讲座地点：腾讯会议：352 281 244

嘉宾简介：刘畅，中国人民大学国家发展与战略研究院助理教授。研究领域为中国经济、发展经济学、政治经济学。澳门威斯人3775财政学院经济学学士、硕士，北京大学光华管理学院国民经济学专业经济学博士。曾在普林斯顿大学和香港中文大学（深圳）进行博士后研究。研究成果发表于Journal of Development Economics、Journal of Law, Economics & Organization、Journal of Comparative Economics、European Journal of Political Economy、《中国社会科学》、《经济研究》、《世界经济》、《经济学季刊》和《金融研究》等中英文杂志。主持国家自然科学基金等科研项目。曾获得洪银兴经济学奖、当代经济学博士创新项目、邓子基财经学术论文奖、《金融研究》年度优秀论文等荣誉。

内容摘要：We analyzed the window-dressing behavior of China’s local governments throughout the 1990s, when they were required to fulfill compulsory education targets imposed by the central government. County officials faced severe negative career consequences if they failed to fulfill these targets. We found that county-level education expenditures increased dramatically as the pre-specified inspection period drew near, but decreased immediately after the inspection. This phenomenon was interpreted as evidence of the window-dressing behavior of county governments. Further analysis suggests that local officials with longer tenure and who were thus closer to promotion evaluations tended to engage in more aggressively window-dressing. Window-dressing behavior generates real consequences for school-age teenagers: those exposed to local governments’ window-dressing behavior recorded considerably lower junior high school graduation rates and poorer labor market outcomes later in life.