讲座主题：Full implementation and information aggregation

主讲嘉宾：孙一飞对外经济贸易大学

讲座时间：2024年10月25日周五14:00

讲座地点：澳门威斯人3775沙河校区11号楼308

嘉宾简介：孙一飞，对外经济贸易大学教授，博士生导师，国家级人才入选者，主要研究领域为博弈论与信息经济学，侧重于机制设计与实施理论，研究成果发表于Journal of Political Economy、Theoretical Economics、Journal of Economic Theory、Games and Economic Behavior等高水平国际期刊，主持并完成国家自然科学基金青年项目一项（结项获评“特优”），面上项目一项，入选2023年中国信息经济学会乌家培资助计划。

内容摘要：The presence of asymmetric information presents significant challenges in designing mechanisms for achieving full implementation. These challenges stem from the exclusivity of private information, whereby agents with access to such information can manipulate their reports to their advantage. McLean andPostlewaite(2002) introduced the concept of information size to quantify the degree of exclusiveness of private information. In this study, we explore the full implementation problem in environments with varying information sizes. We demonstrate that in a special case where no agent can conceal their private information when aggregated with others' true information, full implementation of any social choice can be achieved through a two-stage mechanism in initial rationalizability. Additionally, we analyze the broader conflict and trade-off between the size of private information and the efficiency of achieving full implementation. Our findings underscore the intricate relationship between information asymmetry and mechanism efficiency in addressing asymmetric information scenarios.